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Abstract 
Prior research on the evolution of digital infrastructure has paid considerable attention to effective 
strategies for resolving contradictory tensions, yet what we still do not understand is the role of 
higher-level organizational capabilities that help balance the contradictory tensions that emerge 
during this evolution. In addressing this gap, two related questions guided our investigation: (1) How 
do organizations experience and resolve contradictory tensions throughout the evolution of digital 
infrastructure? and (2) What can we learn about the organizational capabilities that drive strategic 
actions in resolving these contradictory tensions? We approach these questions using an in-depth 
case study at RE/MAX LLC, a global real estate franchise. Based on our findings, we propose a 
theoretical model of digital infrastructure ambidexterity. The model recognizes three pairs of 
capabilities (identifying and germinating, expanding and legitimizing, and augmenting and 
implanting) and two supporting factors (leadership and structure) that are key to resolving 
contradictory tensions during this evolution. This study responds to a recent research call for 
dynamic process perspectives at multiple levels of analysis. We discuss the implications of this 
model for research and practice and offer observations for future research. 
Keywords: Digital Infrastructure Evolution, Organizational Capabilities, Contradictory Tensions, 
Ambidexterity, Exploration and Exploitation, Case Study, Qualitative Research, Real Estate 
Industry. 
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1 Introduction  
Digital infrastructures have been defined as shared, 
unbounded, heterogeneous, open, and evolving 
sociotechnical systems that comprise diverse IT 
capabilities and their use, operations, and design 
communities (Braa et al., 2007; Hanseth & Lyytinen, 
2010). They take a long time to build—very often 
spanning decades rather than a few years (Tilson, 
Lyytinen, & Sørensen, 2010; they require substantial 
financial investment and careful coordination of the 
standards that define key interfaces and behaviors 
(Star, 2002); and they are also path-dependent—
creating further resistance to change (David, 1985). In 
other words, digital infrastructures evolve.   
The challenges faced in the process of digital 
infrastructure evolution has often been acknowledged 
in prior literature as being contradictory in nature. In 
other words, the evolution of digital infrastructure 
often encounters tensions that are contradictory to 
each other. Building on prior research, here we define 
contradiction as “bipolar opposites that are mutually 
exclusive and interdepend such that the opposites 
define and potentially negate each other” (Putman, 
Tensions in the Evolution of Digital Infrastructure 
648 
 
Fairhurst, & Banghart, 2016, p. 70) and we define 
tension as “stress, anxiety, discomfort, or tightness in 
making choices, responding to, and moving forward in 
organizational situations” (p. 69). In prior literature, 
digital infrastructures are seen to be:  
• Stable (supporting existing processes and 
actors), but also flexible (allowing unbounded 
growth) (Henningson & Henriksen, 2011; 
Tilson, Lyytinen, & Sørensen, 2010). 
• Aligned with various standard organizational 
processes, but also with nonstandard structures 
and practices of the organization (Gal, Lyytinen, 
& Yoo, 2008; Monteiro et al., 2013). 
• Enforcing best practices, but also remaining 
diverse and malleable (Scott & Wagner, 2003). 
• Linked to the need for and ability of 
organizations to tighten (centralize) and exert 
control, but also allowing scope for autonomy 
and loosening of control (Bharadwaj et al., 
2013; Rodon & Silva, 2015).     
• Providing the capacity to embrace, adapt, and 
access a range of tasks, but at the same time 
constrained by prior investments, designs, 
decisions, and associated forms of control 
(Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2009; Hanseth 
2000). 
Existing literature has paid considerable attention to 
specific strategies that have proven to be effective in 
resolving contradictory tensions (such as adaptability, 
bootstrapping, decentralization, causal mechanisms, 
governance models, and loosely coupled 
architectures), which may impact successful 
infrastructure evolution (Braa et al., 2007; Bygstad, 
2013; Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2010; Henfridsson and 
Bygstad 2013; Rodon & Silva 2015). In spite of this 
attention, one cannot but wonder: Are we somehow 
missing the forest for the trees? That is, while prior 
research has paid attention to strategic actions, 
focusing overtly on such actions may hinder 
theoretical progress by keeping us from recognizing 
the higher-level capabilities that enable organizations 
to address the contradictory tensions that arise as the 
digital infrastructure evolves (Tilson, Lyytinen, & 
Sørensen, 2010). As O’Reilly and Tushman (2008, p. 
8) note, “what is missing is a clear articulation of those 
specific capabilities that facilitate exploration and 
exploitation”. In other words, as digital infrastructures 
evolve, the challenges that emerge through this 
evolution process are dynamic and may not be 
redressed by focusing on strategic actions alone. While 
the efficacy of the strategic actions is no doubt 
important, what else can we learn and articulate about 
the higher-level organizational capabilities that may 
drive these strategic actions?  
We argue here that central to the evolution of a digital 
infrastructure is the organizational capability to 
continuously identify and resolve contradictory 
tensions. This ability of organizations to attend to and 
deal with competing tensions simultaneously is 
referred to as “ambidexterity” (March, 1991). Our 
purpose in this paper is therefore to shed light on the 
interrelated concepts of contradictory tensions and 
ambidexterity during the evolution of a digital 
infrastructure. More specifically, our examination 
focuses on two related research questions: (1) How do 
organizations experience and resolve contradictory 
tensions throughout the evolution of digital 
infrastructure? and (2) What can we learn about the 
organizational capabilities that drive strategic actions 
in resolving these contradictory tensions? We 
approach our research questions through an in-depth 
case study of RE/MAX, a global real estate franchise, 
and its efforts to establish a digital infrastructure to 
support its associates. In doing so, we present one of 
the first in-depth studies of ambidexterity embracing 
various levels of the organization over time. The 
digital infrastructure, called MainStreet, evolved 
from a stand-alone corporate extranet to a fully 
integrated agent- and broker-driven resource center 
that allows user customization (see the Appendix for 
a detailed description). 
Based on analysis of the rich field data, this study’s 
contribution is in articulating the concept of digital 
infrastructure ambidexterity and proposing its 
underlying theoretical model. The model identifies 
three pairs of capabilities (identifying and germinating, 
expanding and legitimizing, and augmenting and 
implanting), supporting leadership (at the top, middle, 
and operational levels), and supporting structures 
(differentiated, independent, and integrated) that 
enable the ambidexterity that allows the organization 
to attend to contradictory tensions in the evolution of 
digital infrastructure (in initiating, cultivating, and 
growing phases). The theoretical model that we 
advance here has integrative value because it weaves 
together previously dispersed findings and offers a 
more nuanced perspective of the role of organizational 
capabilities, leadership, and structures in managing the 
evolution of a digital infrastructure. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, drawing on 
existing research on digital infrastructure evolution, 
contradictory tensions, and organizational 
ambidexterity, we introduce the concept of digital 
infrastructure ambidexterity. Second, we briefly 
describe the research setting and our data collection 
procedures. Next, to address our first research question 
we provide the case description that articulates how 
RE/MAX experienced and resolved contradictory 
tensions during the evolution of its digital 
infrastructure. In Section 5 (Analysis and Theoretical 
Integration), we address our second research question 
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by structuring our findings around four theoretical 
themes that we identified in the evolution of the digital 
infrastructure that took place at RE/MAX. In 
Section 6 (Discussion), we advance a theoretical 
model that recognizes the capabilities that underlie 
the resolution of contradictory tensions and offer 
observations for future research. Finally, we discuss 
the implications of this study for research and 
practice and present our conclusions. 
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Digital Infrastructure Evolution 
Digital infrastructure evolution has been defined as an 
ongoing, complex, and dynamic process of 
interweaving sociotechnical arrangements that go 
beyond the scope of a single system or technology 
(Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 2010; Henfridsson & 
Bygstad, 2013). Over the past 15 years, we have 
observed the evolution of digital infrastructures 
covering different settings (e.g., health, telecom, 
banking, natural resources, government, and 
manufacturing), levels of analysis (e.g., group, 
organization, industry, and society), and technologies 
(e.g., the Internet, World Wide Web, and electrical 
grids). Only recently, however, has IS research begun 
to focus on the impact of the one class of IT artifacts—
digital infrastructures—that underlie digital 
convergence (Tilson, Lyytinen, & Sørensen, 2010, p. 
748). Tilson, Lyytinen, and Sørensen’s (2010) study 
analyzes all the papers published in Information 
Systems Research during the first 20 years of the 
journal and finds that a mere 2 percent of them were 
attentive to infrastructure issues. The study also finds 
only five papers with infrastructure issues as their 
primary focus, including the groundbreaking analysis 
of the evolution of digital research infrastructure by the 
late Star and Ruhleder (1996). The same authors also 
conducted a similar review of MISQ, with similar 
results (Tilson, Lyytinen, & Sørensen, 2010). More 
recently, the number of special issues and publications 
on digital infrastructure in top IS journals suggests the 
topic is attracting growing attention (Ellingsen & 
Bjørn, 2014; Gregory et al., 2015; Monteiro, Pollock, 
& Williams, 2014; Rodon & Silva, 2015). 
The emerging stream of literature has advanced the 
idea that digital infrastructure evolution entails both 
social and technical elements (Vaast & Walsham, 
2009). Infrastructures often evolve into larger and 
more complex structures without any predefined end 
state, as they are continuously being extended and 
typically operate outside the control of a single 
stakeholder. Greenbaum and Kyng (1991) propose the 
                                                          
1 For recent definitions and comparisons of the various types 
of contradictory tensions (such as paradoxes, dualisms, 
notion of “continuing design in use” to capture the 
practical kinds of reworking necessary to get 
information technologies to function within a 
particular organizational setting. Karasti, Baker, and 
Halkola (2010) coin the term “continuing design” to 
refer to a “development orientation where the 
relationship between short-term and long-term—
traditionally seen as a tension—is addressed and 
accounted for from the point of view of infrastructure 
time by incorporating it as a foundational design 
consideration” (p. 247). Such reorientation is 
necessary because digital infrastructures (that may last 
for decades) evolve over different timescales than 
traditional IT projects (which operate over periods of 
one to three years). Edwards et al. (2007) suggest using 
a metaphor of “growing”—rather than designing or 
building—infrastructures to capture the “sense of an 
organic unfolding within an existing (and changing) 
environment” (p. 369). This study reveals that within 
infrastructures there is a “recurring issue of adjustment 
in which infrastructures adapt to, reshape, or even 
internalize elements of their environment in the 
process of growth and entrenchment” (p. 360). Ribes 
and Finholt (2009) observe that those trying to initiate, 
promote, and grow infrastructures need to integrate the 
“demands of the present” with those imagined as likely 
to be important in “the future”—what Braudel (1949) 
describes as the “long now”. Infrastructure evolution 
thus requires the organization to be able to manage, 
coordinate, and prioritize work on many fronts. Yet, 
we still do not understand how organizations 
experience and resolve contradictory tensions 
throughout the evolution of digital infrastructures. 
2.2 Contradictory Tensions in the 
Evolution of Digital Infrastructure 
The evolution of digital infrastructure entails 
contradictory tensions (and the related terms dualism, 
paradox, dilemma, and dialectic). Handy (1994) notes 
that the phrase, “it’s a paradox”, has become a 
management cliché for describing opposing forces in 
complex organizational environments. For Handy, the 
phrase is overused and underspecified, but it typifies 
the fact that contradictions are the “new normal” in this 
volatile, rapidly changing landscape of organizations.1 
Prior research on digital infrastructure evolution has 
highlighted its complexity, which frequently translates 
into tensions related to goals and priorities and 
contradictory demands in terms of what these 
infrastructures should do and achieve (Jiang et al., 
2014; Ribes & Finholt, 2009; Ribbers & Schoo, 2002; 
Weill & Ross, 2009). Karasti, Baker, and Halkola 
(2006), for example, underscore the importance of 
understanding the “unavoidable tensions and conflicts” 
dilemmas, and contradictions), see Putman, Fairhurst, and 
Banghart (2016).  
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that occur when “balancing multiple frames or local-
global options” (p. 352). Furthermore, Ford and Backoff 
(1988) suggest that infrastructures appear stable only 
when oppositional tendencies are brought into 
recognizable proximity through reflection or interaction.   
Existing literature has paid considerable attention to 
strategies that have proven to be effective in resolving 
contradictory tensions in infrastructure evolution. Such 
strategies include, for example, adaptability (Hanseth 
& Lyytinen, 2010), bootstrapping (Hanseth & 
Aanestad, 2003; Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2010), 
decentralization (Broadbent, Weill, & St.Clair, 1999; 
Ciborra et al., 2000), flexibility (Braa et al., 2007; 
Hanseth, Monteiro, & Hatling, 1996), generativity 
(Bygstad, 2010; Henfridsson & Bygstad, 2013; Silsand 
& Ellingsen, 2014), grafting—merging technological 
innovations into existing sociotechnical 
arrangements—(Sanner, Manda, & Nielsen, 2014). 
Other strategies include using governance models (Ure 
et al., 2009), loosely coupled architecture (Fabri, 
2008), mobilization (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011), and 
stratification and meshworking (Rodon & Silva, 2015). 
These strategies are abstractions that take the form of 
descriptive patterns and self-reinforcing mechanisms 
that produce observable events. This stream of research 
has been useful not only in identifying specific strategies 
that influence the design of digital infrastructures, but 
also, and more importantly, in establishing the 
ontological grounding and analytical language to enable 
us to understand infrastructure evolution (Monteiro, 
Pollock, & Williams, 2014). This research stream has 
not, however, explained the role of organizational 
capabilities in balancing the contradictory tensions that 
emerge during this evolution. 
2.3 Contradictory Tensions and 
Organizational Ambidexterity 
By resolving contradictory tensions, managers 
contribute to an organization’s ability to pursue 
disparate activities simultaneously, which is the focus 
of ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). 
Organizational ambidexterity is the ability of an 
organization to manage both incremental, continuous 
improvements and radical, discontinuous challenges at 
the same time (Tushman & O’Reilly 1996). 
Ambidexterity research has acknowledged that the 
concepts of contradictory tensions and ambidexterity 
are closely interrelated and should be viewed in 
combination (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Gregory et al., 
2015). In fact, Smith and Lewis (2011) observe that 
“Recent ambidexterity research has adopted a paradox 
lens, stressing that overall organizational success 
depends on exploring and exploiting simultaneously” 
(p. 388). Since digital infrastructure evolution entails 
managing contradictory and competing imperatives, 
we argue here that the theoretical integration of 
contradictory tensions and ambidexterity is highly 
suited to studying contradictory demands during 
digital infrastructure evolution. 
Organizational ambidexterity has been conceptualized 
as a dynamic capability based on the insight that 
achieving organizational ambidexterity may involve 
sensing environmental threats, seizing opportunities, 
and dynamically reconfiguring resources accordingly 
(Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016; O’Reilly 
& Tushman, 2008). Furthermore, ambidexterity has 
frequently been referred to as the balancing of 
exploration and exploitation (Raisch et al., 2009). The 
conceptual distinction between exploration and 
exploitation has been studied intensively in various 
disciplines (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; He & 
Wong, 2004) and is a common theme in the strategic 
management literature (Jansen et al., 2008; Levinthal 
& March, 1993; Smith & Tushman, 2005).   
Exploration is defined as activities that increase 
variation by creating new possibilities in the future. 
According to March (1991), exploration is associated 
with activities such as innovation and discovering new 
opportunities. On the other hand, exploitation is 
characterized by routine activities that enhance 
efficiency and discipline at the firm and help develop 
continuous problem-solving procedures (Smith & 
Tushman, 2005). Exploitation involves improvements 
in production, efficiency, and implementation. 
Managing exploration and exploitation 
simultaneously, however, is not an easy task because 
each is associated with fundamentally different 
organizational architectures, processes, competencies, 
and logic (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Smith & Tushman, 
2005). Levinthal and March (1993) argue:  
The basic problem confronting an 
organization is to engage in sufficient 
exploitation to ensure its current viability 
and, at the same time, to devote enough 
energy to exploration to ensure its future 
viability. Survival requires a balance, and the 
precise mix of exploitation and exploration 
that is optimal is hard to specify (p. 105). 
In IS research, the emphasis of ambidexterity research 
has been on the dichotomy between exploration and 
exploitation (Xue, Ray, & Sambamurthy, 2012). 
Companies that focus on exploitation and exclude 
exploration, elicit short-term advantage of the 
technology, maintain a state of stable equilibrium, and 
extract as much value as possible, and as soon as possible, 
from the IT investment—especially if this involves a 
large-scale, multiyear IT investment or significant 
managerial effort. Focusing exclusively on exploitation, 
however, has been found to result in excessive 
automation, routinization, simplification, and core 
rigidities, hurting agility by limiting a firm’s strategic 
choices (Bharadwaj, 2000; Henderson & Clark, 1990; 
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Sanchez, 1995) and its ability to respond to changes 
(Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
Conversely, engaging in exploration and excluding 
exploitation may enhance firms’ ability for renewal by 
searching for potentially disruptive ways of using IT to 
create change proactively rather than reacting to it. 
Researchers have recommended that, when adopting a 
new IT system, companies should innovate and 
improvise with the local working environment 
(Orlikowski, 1996) and tailor their IT and processes to 
reflect changing organizational circumstances and 
requirements. Too much exploration, however, can 
trap companies in an endless cycle of search and 
unrewarding change (Volberda & Lewin, 2003).   
More recently, IS researchers have recognized that 
both exploration and exploitation are needed. The 
organizational ambidexterity perspective has been 
adopted to explain the complementary and substitute 
roles of formal and informal controls in outsourced 
systems development projects (Tiwana, 2010), 
healthcare innovations (Tarafdar & Gordon, 2007), 
and the coexistence of agile and traditional software 
development approaches (Vinekar, Slinkman, & 
Nerur, 2006). It has also been used to explain the need 
to exploit software products in relation to existing 
customers while simultaneously exploring new 
technology and market opportunities (Napier, 
Mathiassen, & Robey, 2010), knowledge sharing in 
long-term relationships (Im & Rai, 2008), and 
typologies of IS strategies (Chen, Mocker, & Preston, 
2010; Leidner, Lo, & Preston, 2011; Lo & Leidner, 
2012). Other studies have used organizational 
ambidexterity to examine the interrelationships 
between IT-enabled practices and practitioners within 
an ongoing praxis (Huang et al., 2014) and the 
transformation of IS strategy during mergers (Gregory, 
Keil, & Muntermann, 2012; Gregory et al., 2015). 
This stream of research, however, has followed the 
tendency of general organizational ambidexterity 
research to focus on one organizational attribute at a 
time to explain ambidexterity—for example, dual 
structures (Bernner & Tushman, 2003; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1997), organizational contexts that 
encourage behavioral ambidexterity (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004), or the behavior of top management 
teams (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Smith & Tushman, 2005; 
Simsek et al., 2005). Overall, the current research has 
drawn attention to a limited set of features that all 
ambidextrous organizations seem to have when 
balancing exploration and exploitation activities, 
including differentiated organizational structure, tight 
or loose corporate culture, common values across the 
firm, and top managers who integrate different units 
and values across the firm. As Gupta, Smith, and 
Shalley (2006, p. 697) warn, “although near consensus 
exists on the need for balance [of exploitation and 
exploration] to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage, there is considerably less clarity on how 
this balance can be achieved”.  
Clear exceptions to the above are the studies by 
Zimmermann, Raisch, and Birkinshaw, (2015), Im and 
Rai (2008), and Gregory et al. (2015), which explicitly 
examine ambidexterity dynamically. Zimmermann, 
Raisch, and Birkinshaw (2015) examine the process by 
which ambidexterity is initiated, using an inductive 
multilevel case study of four alliances, and find that a 
top-down process of charter definition can be 
complemented with a bottom-up process in which 
frontline managers take the initiative to adopt an 
ambidextrous orientation in their part of the 
organization. In analyzing ambidexterity in IT supply 
chain relationships, Im and Rai (2008) find that a 
balance between strategic exploratory and exploitative 
knowledge sharing is needed. Gregory et al. (2015) use 
grounded theory methodology and a multiyear case 
study approach to examine a large IT transformation 
program in a major commercial bank and identify 
interrelated themes of paradoxes and ambidexterity. 
Here we add to this stream of research by focusing on 
important aspects that have been ignored—i.e., 
temporality and multiple levels of the organization. 
2.4 Digital Infrastructure 
Drawing on the literature on digital infrastructures, 
contradictory tensions, and ambidexterity, we 
introduce the concept of “digital infrastructure 
ambidexterity”. We define this concept as the ability to 
continuously and dynamically balance exploration and 
exploitation activities in order to deal with 
contradictory tensions during the evolution of a digital 
infrastructure. Digital infrastructure ambidexterity is a 
dynamic capability—a direct consequence of dynamic 
decision-making activities in temporally orchestrating 
resources (Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008, 2013; Raisch et al., 2009) 
as the digital infrastructure evolves. As the dynamic 
capabilities view has attracted more attention, some 
authors began identifying and explaining the 
mechanisms by which firms’ dynamic capabilities 
adapt to environmental and technological changes 
(Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat, 2000; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). In particular, leadership and structures 
have been identified by prior research as critical 
supporting factors for organizational ambidexterity. 
Pertaining to leadership, Augier and Teece (2009, p. 
417) recognize that “in the dynamic capabilities 
framework, management plays distinctive roles in 
selecting and/or developing routines, making 
investment choices, and in orchestrating non-tradable 
assets to achieve efficiencies and appropriate returns 
from innovations”. Structures are organizational 
mechanisms for recombining and reconfiguring assets 
and for allocating, coordinating, and supervising tasks 
Tensions in the Evolution of Digital Infrastructure 
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“as the enterprise grows, and as markets and 
technologies change” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997, 
p. 1335). While we acknowledge that there might be 
other factors that support ambidexterity, here we focus 
on factors that have been identified in IS research as 
having a critical role (Bharadwaj, 2000; Mata, Fuerst, 
& Barney, 1995; Peppard & Ward, 2004). Thus, in this 
study, we examine the evolution of a digital 
infrastructure at RE/MAX as part of our effort to 
construct a theoretical model of digital infrastructure 
ambidexterity. We scrutinize the salient contradictory 
tensions (whether these be dualisms, paradoxes, or 
dilemmas) that were experienced, and examine how 
these tensions were handled over time by the 
organization (i.e., what the capabilities and supporting 
leadership and structures were used at various 
organizational levels). 
3 Research Approach and Setting 
Given that understanding contradictory tensions in the 
digital infrastructure evolution is a novel phenomenon, 
and little is known, in general, about how 
ambidexterity transpires, we selected an in-depth case 
study research approach. The exploratory and 
qualitative nature of the research questions (Benbasat, 
Goldstein, & Mead, 1987)—“How” do organizations 
experience and resolve contradictory tensions 
throughout the evolution of digital infrastructure? and 
“What” can we learn about the organizational 
capabilities that drive strategic actions in resolving 
these contradictory tensions?—led us to use an in-depth 
case study, or what has been termed a “revelatory case” 
(Yin, 1994). This approach allowed us to capture rich 
details of the evolution of the digital infrastructure and 
focus on the salient tensions as well as the capabilities 
and supporting factors associated with organizational 
ambidexterity (Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 
2016) in a “real-world” setting. 
Our site selection followed Patton’s (1990) suggestion 
that “information-rich cases are those from which one 
can learn a great deal about issues of central 
importance for the purpose of the research” (p. 169). 
Using this criterion, we selected RE/MAX, a leading 
global real estate franchise firm, as a suitable research 
setting for our research. We acquired long-term 
involvement and access to fine-grained, longitudinal 
data about the firm’s launch and evolution over time. 
The contemporary nature of this case meant that we 
had access to extensive documentation and that key 
actors were available for interview.  
3.1 Data Collection 
The specific research questions formulated in the 
introduction to this paper guided the data collection 
process, while what emerged from the data through 
theoretical conceptualization shaped our 
understanding (Glaser, 1978). In accordance with 
Eisenhardt (1989), we reviewed the existing literature 
on digital infrastructure and ambidexterity to “specify 
some potentially important variables” and avoided 
“thinking about specific relationships between 
variables and theories as much as possible, especially 
at the outset of the process” (p. 536). We conducted 
field research (on-site observation, interviews, and 
documentation review) over the course of 16 months 
(March 2010 to June 2011). The advantage of this 
multisourced data was that retrospective data provided 
more observations, while real-time data helped us to 
mitigate retrospective bias (Miller, 1997). 
Furthermore, collecting multiple types of data from 
different sources provided triangulation and increased 
the reliability of the study. 
The research began with formal meetings with the 
RE/MAX top management team. These meetings were 
complemented by the research team visiting the 
headquarters offices and subsequently conducting 
face-to-face interviews. To ensure that the data came 
from all levels of RE/MAX, we conducted 29 
interviews with individuals who were identified as 
being involved in the evolution of MainStreet, 
RE/MAX’s digital infrastructure. These included 
interviews with top and middle managers at RE/MAX 
headquarters, owners of RE/MAX affiliates, real estate 
brokers, real estate agents, IT department personnel, 
and external consultants (see Table 1 for job 
designations). In selecting our interviewees, we also 
took into consideration our previous interviews and 
views conveyed through secondary materials or notes 
from our own field observations, as advised by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967). To secure an independent, 
objective position in the field (Pratt, 2009), we 
contacted these informants ourselves and solicited 
their support for our research project. The corporate 
management kept their distance and acted primarily as 
a sponsor of our overall project. We tailored 
semistructured interviews to each person, focusing on 
a brief history of the interviewee’s involvement with 
the firm, their perceptions of events that transpired, and 
why/how decisions and activities were influenced and 
made, and how conflicts were resolved. The interviews 
were recorded and transcribed, and additional 
observations were noted at the time of the interview. 
To minimize bias and increase the study’s reliability, 
we followed the guidance on retrospective 
interviewing techniques suggested by Golden (1992) 
and Miller (1997); this included using multiple 
knowledgeable informants, asking informants to recall 
simple facts or concrete events rather than past 
opinions or beliefs, ensuring confidentiality, 
minimizing the duration and inconvenience of data 
collection, and explaining the usefulness of the topic. 
At least two of the researchers were present in all 
interviews—one researcher asked questions, while the 
other listened, took notes, and asked for clarification as 
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required. This made it possible for us to discuss each 
interview in detail and to compare notes and 
interpretations. At the end of each interview, we asked 
the interviewee to suggest other individuals who would 
be potential sources for helping us understand the 
evolution of MainStreet at RE/MAX. 
Written data included both primary sources (annual 
reports, firm archival analyses, organizational charts, 
strategic information systems documents, and internal 
correspondence and memos) and secondary sources 
(real estate industry reports, trade magazines, 
newspapers, and relevant published books). Although 
many of the documents we collected were confidential, 
they served to confirm or disconfirm interpretations 
made throughout the data analysis process.  
Table 1. Source of the Interviews Conducted 
Reference Area/Role Duration (minutes) 
1 VP IT 92 
2 CEO, CFO 75 
3 CFO, SVP IT, VP eBusiness 78 
4 MainStreet product manager and MainStreet product analyst 65 
5 Web developer 67 
6 Senior manager, application development 69 
7 Senior Manager, product strategy 72 
8 Data analyst 69 
9 VP eBusiness 86 
10 MainStreet, product manager 81 
11 BDA consulting 79 
12 Senior manager, eCare 72 
13 Director, production services, media & training 66 
14 Director, RE/MAX University 82 
15 VP education, media, & training 68 
16 Senior VP eBusines and emerging technologies 85 
17 Executive director, membership services/contracts,  89 
18 Senior manager, technology training, ebusiness 77 
20 Broker/owner RE/MAX professionals 75 
21 MainStreet product manager 69 
22 Membership database manager 62 
23 VP/Regional director 71 
24 VP/Regional director central/northern Ohio 77 
25 VP/Regional director Carolinas region 63 
26 Broker/Owner 79 
27 Agent 1 64 
28 Broker manager/Owner 82 
29 Agent 2 75 
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Furthermore, throughout this investigation, we had 
access to the online community of RE/MAX agents. 
We also attended a two-day forum for MainStreet’s 
users, developers, and technology partners and vendors 
at RE/MAX. Observational notes, which we took 
during all of the visits, included numerous references 
to changes in how people viewed MainStreet over 
time, including how concerns shifted, reactions varied, 
and how perceptions were both similar and diverse. In 
addition, throughout the data collection, we had the 
advantage of access to the senior vice president of 
emerging technologies, a key informant, who granted 
us several interviews. In total, this research study 
generated a database containing approximately 35 
hours of recorded interviews, 50 pages of 
observational notes, 394 pages of transcribed 
interviews (215,536 words), and over 2,500 pages of 
secondary documentation. 
3.2 Data Collection 
Given the nature of the process data from this study, 
we combined several strategies for sensemaking, as 
suggested by Langley (1999) and Langley et al. (2013), 
moving back and forth between the data and theoretical 
conceptualization. First, during the data collection, 
notes on the facts, specific details, and other pieces of 
information that a number of informants seemed to 
repeat helped to augment our understanding of the 
evolution of the digital infrastructure at RE/MAX (van 
Maanen, 1983), as did ideas generated by the three co-
authors during periodic debriefing sessions. 
Second, we followed a narrative strategy in which we 
constructed a detailed story from raw data (Langley, 
1999, p. 695). We used background documents, 
publicly available information, and transcripts of 
interviews and meetings to create a detailed narrative 
history of the evolution of MainStreet. Though this 
strategy is descriptive in nature, it provides a 
mechanism for condensing the large volume of data 
and moving toward a more in-depth case study analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The narrative created a chain of 
evidence that allows others to “follow the derivation of 
any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate 
case study conclusions” (Yin, 1994, p. 84), thus 
increasing the reliability of the study. The resulting 
rich process description of our case formed an 
important basis for addressing our first research 
question—namely, how contradictory tensions were 
experienced and resolved at RE/MAX throughout the 
digital infrastructure evolution. More importantly, this 
also prepared us to address our second research question, 
namely, how to recognize the higher-order capabilities 
that drive strategic actions in resolving contradictory 
tensions, as articulated in the theoretical model. 
Third, we employed a theoretical template strategy 
(Langely, 1999) by drawing on existing literature on 
digital infrastructure evolution, contradictory tensions, 
and ambidexterity. This step in the analysis involved a 
variation on qualitative pattern-matching between 
theory and data (see Campbell, 1975, and Yin, 1994), 
and allowed us to focus on contextual and process-
oriented elements, as well as on the activities of key 
players associated with the evolution of MainStreet. 
We followed open coding and axial coding techniques 
as proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1990). During 
open coding, we categorized the data into concepts that 
were derived from individual and collective activities 
and from the interaction between business actors and 
technology that appeared to have influenced the digital 
infrastructure evolution. For example, informants often 
referred to “identifying members with complementary 
knowledge”, “identifying relevant knowledge related 
to the infrastructure”, and “absorbing new knowledge 
as a group” when they described how exploration-
oriented activities were managed in the initiating phase 
of MainStreet’s evolution. These first-order codes 
were grounded in the case context.  
Subsequently, we compared and contrasted these codes 
with the array of concepts discussed in the literature on 
digital infrastructures and ambidexterity to include 
second-order concepts (e.g., “structures” and 
“capabilities”) that comprise multiple first-order 
concepts (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as shown in Tables 
3-8. Our interview transcripts were cross-checked to 
verify that concepts were supported by at least two 
sources of evidence. A key element in this analytical 
step was the creation of an event listing, a technique 
that can provide insight into “what led to what, and 
when” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 110). The 
concepts derived from individual and collective 
activities and from the interaction between business 
actors and the digital infrastructure represent our 
interpretation, based on evidence gathered from 
interviewees. By comparing incidents across the 
categories that emerged during axial coding, we 
organized, clustered, and mapped the theoretical 
components into metaconcepts, as shown in Table 2. 
As these concepts became integrated and further data 
collection did not cause modifications but rather 
reinforced the properties already identified, the 
concepts were deemed theoretically saturated. 
Fourth, several contacts at the research site reviewed 
the narrative, incident charts, and theoretical map, 
which allowed detailed discussion of the findings. In 
these discussions, different interpretations were 
provided by our contacts, which resulted in an 
increased understanding and a richer analysis. The 
entire analysis was iterative and involved moving back 
and forth among the data, the existing literature, and 
the concepts that emerged as salient at the research site. 
In the next section, we present the evolution of the 
digital infrastructure that took place at RE/MAX. 
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Table 2. Concept Code List and Sources 
Concept code Code definition Source 
Contradictory 
tensions 
Contradictory yet interrelated tensions that exist simultaneously and 
persist over time; such tensions seem logical when considered in 
isolation, but irrational, inconsistent, and absurd when juxtaposed 
Smith & Lewis, 2011; 
Putman, Fairhurst, & 
Banhart 2016  
Supporting leadership Management distinctive role of articulating goals, developing skills, 
and setting routines to sense new opportunities, and then seize them 
and reconfigure the organization accordingly  
Augier & Teece, 2009; 
Jansen et al., 2009; Xue et 
al., 2012 
Supporting structure Firm mechanisms to recombine and reconfigure assets and allocate, 
coordinate, and supervise tasks to support the digital infrastructure 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997; Teece, 2007 
Supporting 
differentiated 
structure 
Using a separate unit to manage all exploration and exploitation 
activities 
Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
Duncan, 1976 
Supporting 
independent structure 
Using specialized units to manage either exploration or exploitation 
activities 
Bower & Christensen, 1995; 
Jansen et al., 2009 
Supporting  
Integrated Structure 
A structure using a set of formal and informal mechanisms and 
involving various levels of the firm in managing exploration and 
exploitation activities 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Westerman et al., 2006 
Ambidexterity Ability to balance exploration and exploitation activities March, 1991; O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2008, 2013; 
Zimmermann et al., 2015 
Exploration activity Activities that increase variation by creating new opportunities to focus 
more on the future, such as innovation and discovering new 
possibilities 
Baum et al., 2000; March, 
1991; Smith & Tushman, 
2005 
Exploitation activity Activities that help a firm to learn from its local search, and to select 
and reuse its existing knowledge and routines so that it can make 
improvements in efficiency and implementation 
Baum et al., 2000; March, 
1991; Smith & Tushman, 
2005 
Identifying capability Ability to recognize, establish, and determine the value of the digital 
infrastructure to the firm as well as the potential drawbacks  
In vivo 
Germinating capability  Ability to give embryonic protection by addressing needs with 
resources and providing support 
In vivo 
Expanding capability  Ability to increase in functionality and innovation, develop further, and 
increase or extend the use of the digital infrastructure 
In vivo 
Legitimizing capability Ability to affirm and give a functional space to the digital infrastructure 
within the firm and in accordance with operational rules and standards  
In vivo 
Augmenting capability Ability to make the digital infrastructure produce better results or 
value, and augment flexibility by increasing stakeholder involvement 
In vivo 
Implanting capability Ability to embed the digital infrastructure firmly and deeply within the 
firm and make it an integral part of operations 
In vivo 
Note:  Grounded, in vivo codes are shown in italics. Several codes that were used to identify cases and interviewees have been omitted 
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4 Case Description 
RE/MAX’s business goal is to sell franchises and 
recruit and retain real estate agents. To accomplish this, 
the firm provides its network of franchisees with a 
strong brand name, proven business practices, and 
operational support (including training and education, 
IT support, and timely market knowledge). Its founder, 
Dave Liniger, understood that IT was the foundation of 
doing business in the digital economy, particularly in 
information-sensitive industries like real estate. Since 
the late 1980s, RE/MAX has invested and embarked on 
IT initiatives that often lead the industry. In particular, 
RE/MAX developed MainStreet, which started as a 
basic agent-centric intranet and evolved into a 
multifunction, multi-interface, and multi-stakeholder 
digital infrastructure. This study focuses on the 
evolution of MainStreet since its inception in 1998. 
Although the evolution of a digital infrastructure can 
be perceived as a set of discrete events over time, our 
case shows the importance of distinguishing various 
temporal phases explicitly since the contradictory 
tensions are not homogenous across time. We therefore 
began by recognizing points of significant change—
that is, dramatic changes in the challenges faced, as 
well as in the leadership and structures. We identified 
three distinct phases of a digital infrastructure 
evolution—initiating, cultivating, and growing. The 
emphasis in the initiating phase is on learning and 
identifying the digital infrastructure charter while 
understanding its strategic potential within the firm and 
avoiding letting it become a distraction that could drain 
resources. The first condition during the initiating 
phase is to have a general awareness of the new digital 
infrastructure and its perceived potential impact to 
solve a business need or opportunity of sufficient 
proportion to capture the attention of a sponsor group. 
In the cultivating phase, the focus is on nurturing the 
digital infrastructure, typically a prototype or a limited 
solution, to evaluate its impact on a reduced domain. If 
the infrastructure begins to yield benefits, potentially 
valuable innovations are added while its existing 
functionality is preserved, and leaders are encouraged 
to expand their efforts, as suggested by McGrath et al. 
(1996). By the growing phase, there is a high degree of 
consensus about the benefits of the digital 
infrastructure and a shared understanding of what it can 
offer is well disseminated across the organization. 
Some understanding is embedded in the digital 
infrastructure itself, and some is embedded in the 
structures, routines, and prescribed practices. 
Each of the phases provides a way of structuring our 
findings around a certain continuity in the activities 
relating to the evolution of the digital infrastructure 
that took place at RE/MAX. As recommended by 
Langley (1999), this temporal structuring allows 
establishing comparative units of analysis that we use 
in the analysis and discussion sections. In the following 
subsections, we detail each phase of the evolution of 
MainStreet at RE/MAX. 
4.1 The Initiating Phase (1998-2001) 
In early 1998 the Internet was already widely used 
across several industries and companies, but it had not 
yet been adopted within the real estate industry. 
Several brokers and agents at RE/MAX raised the idea 
of using the Internet internally. Although they 
perceived its potential benefits, RE/MAX lacked the 
expertise and technical infrastructure to support it. 
Liniger worried that an investment in the Internet 
would be a cash drain for the company and an attention 
diversion for associates, but agreed to look into it. 
Liniger followed through by asking his director of IT, 
Bruce Benham, and the manager of the IT User 
Support group, Kristi Graning, to examine the 
possibilities. A RE/MAX officer recalled how “Liniger 
chose his early explorations and members of the team 
carefully, knowing how critical it was to get accurate 
scouting reports of the terrain ahead”. Liniger’s 
knowledge of RE/MAX and his passion for training 
and education was complemented by Benham’s formal 
IT training and Granings’ operational experience in 
managing the IT User Support group. Rather than just 
jumping onto the Internet bandwagon, this corporate 
team began investigating the competitive situation and 
assessing the technology’s business value for the firm. 
They flew around the country over the next few 
months, attended meetings as a team, shared ideas, 
assessed challenges, and set adoption objectives. 
Given RE/MAX management’s emerging technology 
expertise and the firm’s nascent infrastructure, Liniger 
and his team engaged the services of Online System 
Services, Inc., to build, host, and manage this initiative. 
In July 1998 RE/MAX MainStreet was launched as a 
password-protected extranet connecting the firm’s 
associates and staff. The investment in the new digital 
infrastructure was based on the perceived operational 
improvements and cost reductions. As Benham 
explained at the time of the launch, “RE/MAX 
MainStreet will greatly enhance the communication 
process—and save everyone time and money— by 
moving away from phone calls, faxes and express 
mail” (Harkins & Hollihan, 2005). 
The team enacted a shared view of the future by pulling 
together collective wisdom from across the company. 
As the team grasped the Internet’s potential, they 
realized that the company’s new initiative was not 
solely about IT. Instead, they formulated a strategy 
aimed at using the capability of this technology as a 
crucial vehicle for bringing together different elements 
of the RE/MAX brand and providing information, 
training, and resources to the company’s associates. At 
the same time, aware that the company had limited 
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skills and expertise and lacked an appropriate technical 
infrastructure, the team turned to outsourcing to 
overcome these deficiencies and avoid draining the 
company’s scarce resources. 
4.2 The Cultivating Phase (2001-2007) 
By mid-2001, managing the expansion of MainStreet 
was becoming a challenge for the corporate team as it 
became clear that in-depth knowledge of this digital 
infrastructure was kept within the team and that only 
limited knowledge had been diffused to the rest of the 
firm. In addition, the increasing need for resources to 
keep innovating and expanding the functionality of this 
infrastructure was difficult to justify, as only a small 
proportion of agents were using it. Furthermore, 
although the corporate team was working hard in 
communicating the benefits of MainStreet and 
coordinating day-to-day operational activities 
relating to the use of MainStreet, as mentioned by a 
RE/MAX agent, “they lacked the capability to stay 
tuned to the field and listen to successes and failures 
to further improve it”. 
Liniger made the decision to promote the members of 
the corporate team. Benham became chief operations 
officer (COO) and Graning became the head of 
corporate IT. Two separate units were created, each 
reporting to corporate IT: the IT department and 
eBusiness. The IT department, which was engaged in 
exploitative activities, was responsible for overseeing 
application development, systems administration, 
business analytics, quality assurance, network 
operations, infrastructure, data center operations, 
network security, and desktop support. eBusiness 
initially focused on technological exploration activities 
to better support agents and brokers. External IT 
consultant John Daniels explained: “The IT department 
is more in the execution of the technology. The other one 
[eBusiness] is looking for the next functionality”. 
The IT department made MainStreet the hub of 
RE/MAX’s existing IT applications aimed at 
supporting the productivity of its agents. In December 
2006, the company integrated RE/MAX Design Center 
into MainStreet, legitimizing an IT application that 
was originally developed at three of its affiliates 
(RE/MAX of New Jersey, California, and Hawaii). 
This service offered a full suite of online marketing 
tools available exclusively through RE/MAX 
MainStreet, including brochures, flyers, presentation 
cards, printing and mailing services, ad campaigns, 
electronic greeting cards, virtual tours, slideshows, and 
multimedia presentations—complete with web 
traffic reporting tools to identify the performance of 
online marketing campaigns. 
The eBusiness department, on the other hand, actively 
sought providers of complementary resources and 
services to enhance MainStreet. During this phase, 
MainStreet was redesigned several times in order to 
provide innovative services to RE/MAX associates and 
staff members. MainStreet added services such as 
breaking news, company information, online 
discussion threads, chat areas for real-time exchanges 
and conferences, and a library for documents, forms, 
and other resource materials. In addition, RE/MAX 
established agreements with different providers who 
offered their services to its franchise members through 
MainStreet. In 2006 RE/MAX partnered with 
eNeighborhoods, one of the largest MLS data providers 
in the United States, to launch RE/MAX LeadStreet: a 
proprietary online sales lead-generator and lead 
management tool. In September 2007, RE/MAX 
unveiled RE/MAX University, a comprehensive 
training service that expanded its earliest satellite 
training services to provide broadcast, online, and 
classroom educational services all under one umbrella 
and offered through RE/MAX MainStreet. 
The product management, training, and support units 
within the IT department and eBusiness were involved 
in both exploitative and exploratory activities. 
Exploitative activities included communicating and 
coordinating existing and new IT applications across 
the RE/MAX network and managing relationships 
with franchisees. Executive Director of Membership 
Jamie Geer explained that employees in those units are  
those middlemen and that voice between the 
contract that they [franchisees] have signed 
and their five-year term and that voice who 
continues to say, “this is the value, this is 
why you are part of RE/MAX, this is what 
we have continued to create that you can 
offer your agents”.  
Furthermore, a RE/MAX product manager reflected 
that: 
Agents want to make money. So, we are 
there to help them by showing how to utilize 
these tools to make more money…. 
Technology trainers are traveling two to 
three weeks a month, and are responsible 
for delivering the message, delivering the 
communication about our existing 
technologies. 
At the same time, given that these technology trainers 
were the interface between the RE/MAX offices and 
headquarters, they were also in a position to discover 
new needs as well as to suggest improvements to 
MainStreet. For example, Geer commented:  
Technology initiatives such as LeadStreet 
and Design Center came from our affiliates. 
I can tell you that Northern Illinois and New 
Jersey had a LeadStreet initiative setup well 
before us. They were aggregating listing 
services and getting all listings on a website 
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for a consumer base to view. We have 
always said the best ideas come from the 
field. The best ideas start small because the 
regions have the flexibility. They have fewer 
people to explain how they spend money. 
We just took the idea and made it work for 
the whole franchise.… So, our job is to 
decide what we roll out and when to say, 
“handle it at your office level”. 
4.3 The Growing Phase (2008-2012) 
Early in 2008 MainStreet’s capacity to grow and to 
leverage, adapt, and access a range of real estate 
services began to be constrained by design and 
investment decisions made during the cultivating 
phase. MainStreet underwent many iterations and 
modifications to meet the evolving needs of the 
business and the associates, making it difficult for 
RE/MAX to keep the digital infrastructure fresh and 
grow its functionality. 
The third phase began early in 2008 when the 
company’s senior management began to realize how 
strategically important the digital infrastructure was 
becoming for RE/MAX and its associates. The 
infrastructure’s lack of flexibility was also becoming 
apparent, and there were difficulties coordinating with 
the outsource provider over the changes needed. Marie 
Blanco, the VP of eBusiness, explained: 
[MainStreet] had been pieced together over 
the years.… We limped along with it, but we 
didn’t do a lot of integration. We did the 
minimal support so that people could at 
least sign into MainStreet, click LeadStreet, 
and get into the LeadStreet system, so we 
just did a single sign-on pass-through at 
that time.... We applied bandages to it 
beyond belief. It wasn’t flexible, it couldn’t 
scale, and the technology badly needed to 
be updated. 
Graning added:  
We didn’t have any flexibility with [the 
outsourcing provider]. We didn’t have the 
control and the resources to make 
MainStreet do what the business needed it 
to do. Simple changes could take anywhere 
from two to eight weeks, and they would 
charge us several hundred dollars. 
Furthermore, during the first two phases of 
MainStreet’s evolution, RE/MAX headquarters 
covered all the expenses of building and maintaining 
the platform. As it became more complex, however, 
top management made the decision that MainStreet 
was to be financed by the franchisees as part of the 
RE/MAX’s national advertising fund. This created an 
economic incentive for the IT-focused staff at 
RE/MAX. They understood, as Geer explained, that 
“the more agents I can get, the more money I can spend 
in the national ad fund that would sponsor new 
technologies”. This approach was also helpful in 
securing financial support even during the downturn in 
the real estate industry. On the other hand, this decision 
also implied a need to accommodate competing goals 
from multiple stakeholders. Blanco explained, 
Back then, when we came up with an idea, 
we would spend several hours putting a 
business plan together.… OK, let’s get [it] 
approved and then we started pulling all the 
people and the pieces together. Today that 
is not how it works at all. It is not right or 
wrong. It is just different. It is a very 
committee-based type of decision making. 
Today franchisees want to have 
involvement, provide input, and have a say 
in how things get implemented. Very 
rightfully so, as technology impacts their 
agents and brokers and they want to be a 
part of that. 
Liniger again played an important role in overseeing 
the digital infrastructure evolution in this phase. He 
respected the autonomy of the structural unit in charge 
of managing the infrastructure, but also created a sense 
of accountability and tracking progress. Blanco 
summarized this approach in explaining that “the 
management vision of how this all works follows an 
eagle-eyed approach overseeing the changes in the 
technology”. Liniger, however, became concerned that 
the exploration activities realized by eBusiness were 
mainly focused on the short term. He therefore decided 
to change the organizational structure once more in late 
2009 in order to better identify and explore new long-
term IT trends. Blanco reflected that: 
Our executive management team made the 
decision that our Senior VP of eBusiness 
needed to focus more on emerging 
technologies…. So, now she is looking at 
what the next big thing is for RE/MAX… The 
IT department was moved to report directly 
to the RE/MAX COO. 
Graning, explained “I have to keep an eye on the ball 
on what is happening. I am online all the time, I am 
following people on Twitter, I am listening to 
technologists, and I am listening to companies”. 
Early in this phase, RE/MAX recognized that to grow 
MainStreet further, integrate it with other company 
operations, make its business operations more 
efficient, and enable it to maintain a strong connection 
with its associates, MainStreet needed to be hosted and 
managed in-house. RE/MAX contracted external 
consultants to help insource the development, 
operation, and maintenance of MainStreet. It also 
selected and acquired a specialized technology and 
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business model in order to provide MainStreet services 
in-house. It engaged the help of Analysis International 
Corporation, a company specializing in collaboration, 
infrastructure, and project and application solutions, 
and proceeded to redesign MainStreet.  
At the same time, MainStreet kept innovating and 
growing in functionality. Graning commented: 
MainStreet is the funnel for doing business 
with RE/MAX. It’s the one place all of our 
associates go to get the information they 
need. This is a huge organization and, as 
such, it is essential to a franchisee’s 
business that the associates have central 
access to information. 
Furthermore, the decision that MainStreet was to be 
financed as part of the RE/MAX’s national advertising 
fund also implied that a committee made up of 
representatives from different parts of the RE/MAX 
network would have to agree on how the national 
advertising fund was used. So, in addition to the formal 
management structure of MainStreet, RE/MAX also 
introduced ad hoc mechanisms to engage and provide 
closer communication and coordination with 
individuals who had various stakes in the technology’s 
continued success, and this, in turn, balanced 
exploration and exploitation activities. Graning 
explained, for example, that:  
Twice a year there is a formal process in 
which ideas are solicited from both within 
and outside the company. These suggestions 
help identify disruptive technologies, new 
business models, and attractive new 
markets. This effort typically results in 
several hundreds of ideas… These are 
scrutinized and reduced and small teams 
are formed to do a more detailed strategic 
analysis. Based on these findings, I will then 
begin to socialize promising ideas among 
senior executives and broker owners, to 
determine acceptance. Once ideas have 
passed this test, we will do a dive to 
properly understand the market 
opportunity. 
Blanco added: 
We have formal and informal meetings to 
assess how any change would impact our 
membership and, then, how it would impact 
our recruiting and retention. Our bottom 
line is: How do we sell franchises recruit 
and retain agents? So, everything is driving 
towards those goals and saying, OK, how is 
this change that we are making way back 
here going to eventually impact that 
corporate goal? 
5 Analysis and Theoretical 
Integration 
From our analyses, four main dimensions emerged, 
together with their second-order themes and the first-
order concepts that led to the formation of those 
themes. The overarching emergent dimensions include 
the salient contradictory tension, supporting 
leadership, supporting structure, and exploration-
oriented and exploitation-oriented activities that help 
to balance exploration and exploitation (i.e., achieve 
ambidexterity) in order to resolve the contradictory 
tension at each phase of the digital infrastructure 
evolution. Eisenhardt (1989) advocates the approach of 
moving back and forth between theoretical 
conceptualization and case findings, noting that 
“overall, tying the emergent theory to existing 
literature enhances the internal validity, generality, 
generalizability, and theoretical level of theory 
building from case study research” (p. 545). 
Furthermore, we distinguish carefully between the 
insights we gained from observing of the path that 
unfolded within our case study’s specific digital 
infrastructure setting and possible generalizations to 
other settings, which is what Lee and Baskerville 
(2003) refer to as “generalizing from case study 
findings to theory” (p. 236). 
5.1 Balancing Exploration and 
Exploitation in the Initiating Phase 
During this phase, a decision maker in a position of 
responsibility and authority becomes aware of the 
particular technology and decides to evaluate it further. 
The primary role of a decision maker during this phase 
is to foster conditions that will let management capture 
and exploit the knowledge that already exists inside 
and outside the firm. Table 3 shows the data structure 
of our findings during this phase of the digital 
infrastructure evolution, and Table 4 provides 
representative supporting data from RE/MAX for each 
second-order theme. 
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Table 3. Salient Contradictory Tensions, Supporting Leadership and Structure,  
and Tension Resolution in the Initiating Phase 
Salient  
contradictory 
tension 
• Introducing a digital infrastructure is perceived potentially as a means to save resources, but also as 
a distraction that could drain resources 
Supporting 
leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supporting 
structure 
      
1st-order theme 
 
• Top management actively involved in choosing/formalizing the leading 
team 
 
• Top management actively involved in providing resources 
 
2nd-order theme  
 
 
Supporting 
top mgmt. 
 
 
• Middle and operational management not involved   
 
 
 
  
Supporting middle 
& operational  
 mgmt. 
1st-order theme 
 
• Enabling a group of individuals to focus on the adoption  
 
• Balancing exploration and exploitation activities   
 
2nd-order theme  
 
Supporting 
differentiated 
structure 
 
Tension resolution 
(ambidexterity) 
exploration 
activities 
 
 
 
 
Exploitation 
activities 
1st-order theme 
 
• Identifying members with complementary knowledge 
 
• Identifying relevant knowledge about the infrastructure 
 
• Absorbing new knowledge as a group 
2nd-order theme  
 
 
 
Identifying 
capability 
1st-order theme 
 
• Crystallizing the objective of the digital infrastructure 
 
• Assessing the required technology competence   
 
• Establishing early funding to support the infrastructure 
2nd-order theme  
 
 
 
Germinating 
capability 
5.1.1 Contradictory Tension 
During this phase, the salient contradictory tension is 
derived from the general awareness that the digital 
infrastructure could potentially save resources, but that 
it might also become a distraction that could drain 
resources. Prior research has identified this 
contradictory tension associated with digital 
infrastructures in general (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 
2009; Hanseth 2000), but not specifically in this phase 
of their evolution. Given that the firm’s experience and 
technical infrastructure are limited, participants are 
unable to perceive the long-term implications, but 
there is a broad awareness that the digital infrastructure 
could be an important determinant of the firm’s ability 
to garner rents.   
At RE/MAX, Liniger was aware of the need to invest 
in supporting the technology but was concerned that it 
would be a cash drain and an attention diversion. 
Furthermore, he was conscious that the Internet was 
being used extensively across various industries and 
companies and he realized its potential benefits for 
businesses. At the same time, he was sensitive to the 
fact that the real estate industry had not commonly 
adopted the Internet and that his company had limited 
expertise and skills and also lacked the technical 
infrastructure to support its use.
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Table 4: Representative Supporting Data for Each First- and Second-Order Theme in the Initiating Phase 
Second-order themes First-order themes Representative data and quotes from RE/MAX 
Supporting top 
management 
Top management actively involved in 
choosing/formalizing the leading team 
“Liniger chose his early explorations and members of 
the team carefully, knowing how critical it was to get 
accurate scouting reports of the terrain ahead”. 
Top management actively involved in 
providing the resources needed 
“At that time, Liniger had to invest money into this 
project [MainStreet], so it could become a reality”. 
Supporting differentiated 
structure 
Enabling a group of individuals to focus on 
the adoption  
A corporate team was created separately from daily 
operations.  
 
Balancing exploration and exploitation 
activities 
The team became a forum that examined the 
characteristics of the Internet solution, reflected on 
the needs of RE/MAX’s associates, assessed existing 
practices and cross-functional processes and systems, 
and planned for the new strategic initiatives. 
Identifying capability Identifying members with complementary 
knowledge 
Liniger’s knowledge of the industry was 
complemented by Benham’s formal IT training and 
Graning’s operational experience in managing the IT 
Users group. 
Identifying relevant knowledge about the 
infrastructure 
The corporate team attended meetings, shared ideas 
with other firms, and negotiated with potential 
technology providers as well as providers of 
complementary services. 
Absorbing new knowledge as a group The corporate team enacted a shared view by pulling 
together collective wisdom from across the firm. 
Germinating capability Crystallizing the objective of the digital 
infrastructure 
As corporate team members grasped the potential of 
the Internet, they established a strategic aim to adopt 
it as a vehicle for bringing together different elements 
of the RE/MAX brand and providing information, 
training, and resources to the company’s associates. 
Assessing the required technology 
competence   
 
Given the lack of technological expertise and 
infrastructure, RE/MAX partners with OSS, Inc., to 
develop, host, and manage MainStreet.  
 
Establishing early funding to support the 
infrastructure 
Given that the technology was to “enhance the 
communication process—and save everyone time 
and money—by moving away from phone calls, 
faxes, and express mail”, every agent had to pay a fee 
to use it. 
5.1.2 Supporting Leadership 
During the initiating phase, top management is the 
driving force behind the technological initiative and is 
actively involved in identifying and nurturing it while 
also assessing its drawbacks. This involves seeking out 
people both inside and outside the organization who 
already have experience with the new technology and 
helping to articulate the vision. At the same time, top 
management also needs to build a team with the 
required competencies, set goals, offer support, nurture 
resources, and provide motivation through a stretching 
intent and by pushing people to achieve goals and 
having trust in them. As our study demonstrates, each of 
these strategies enhances learning by top managers who 
play a pivotal role in driving ambidexterity (Lubatkin et 
al., 2006; Probst, Raisch, & Tushman, 2011). 
5.1.3 Supporting Structure: Differentiated 
Our analysis suggests that during the initiating phase, 
having a dedicated corporate team is useful because it 
enables knowledge to be absorbed at the top of the 
organization in a unified way, allows the team to 
manage the nurturing resources close to the locus of 
change, and shields the team from the rest of the 
organization. It enables the team to pursue exploration 
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and exploitation simultaneously, through activities that 
involve understanding the characteristics of the new 
technology, assessing potential drawbacks, and 
reflecting on the needs of the various stakeholders. At 
the same time, the team will also be evaluating existing 
providers of core and complementary technologies and 
services as well as planning and steering the charter 
definition of the new digital infrastructure. This 
concurs with prior ambidexterity research suggesting 
that the necessary balance can be maintained by 
developing a supportive organizational structure 
within a particular organizational unit (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976). 
5.1.4 Ambidexterity (Tension Resolution) 
We find two capabilities, identifying and germinating, 
that are critical in balancing exploration and 
exploitation during this phase to resolve the 
contradictory tension mentioned above. These 
capabilities create a virtuous cycle as the search for a 
new digital infrastructure and for business 
opportunities is fostered and new knowledge is shared 
internally as well as externally to the firm; at the same 
time, the new digital infrastructure is nurtured and 
protected during this embryonic phase. 
Identifying is the ability to recognize, establish, and 
determine the value of the digital infrastructure to the 
firm as well as the potential drawbacks. The case show 
that critical exploration-oriented activities in solving 
contradictory tensions during this phase include 
identifying members with complementary knowledge, 
identifying relevant knowledge about the 
infrastructure, and absorbing new knowledge as a 
group. At RE/MAX, the corporate team met every day 
for several months to work specifically on this 
initiative—it became a large part of a few people’s 
jobs, instead of a small part of many people’s jobs. The 
team became a forum that examined the digital 
infrastructure characteristics, reflected on the needs of 
associates, assessed existing practices and cross-
functional processes and systems, and planned for the 
new initiative. Top management did not begin with a 
grand plan of where RE/MAX was heading when the 
decision was made to investigate the potential of using 
the Internet within the firm. The corporate team 
articulated and described the immediate steps that were 
manageable, and it was this articulation that set a force 
into action (Oliver, 1997). 
Germinating is the ability to give the embryonic digital 
infrastructure protection by providing the resources 
and support required. After identifying a potential 
digital infrastructure, it is important to seize and 
nurture its potential to meet a particular business need 
while avoiding draining resources in supporting it. In 
the initiating phase, critical exploitation-oriented 
activities include crystallizing the objective of the 
digital infrastructure, assessing the required 
technological competence, and establishing the initial 
funding to support the infrastructure. At RE/MAX, as 
understanding of the technology increased and the 
existing resource constraints became clearer, the 
corporate team realized that it would require far more 
resources than could be provided by the firm. The 
stretch—the mismatch between resources, expertise, 
and aspirations—was an important problem faced by 
this team in protecting the embryonic digital 
infrastructure. Given that the firm did not have all the 
skills and expertise required to set up the digital 
infrastructure, acquiring them through outsourcing was 
important in enabling the team to seize the 
opportunities offered by this new technology. 
5.2 Balancing Exploration and 
Exploitation in the Cultivating 
Phase 
Our study suggests that during this phase integrating 
resources into the core activities of the technical 
solution is crucial in expanding the scope of the digital 
infrastructure while legitimizing its use within the 
firm, as presented in Table 5. Table 6 provides 
representative supporting data from RE/MAX for each 
of these concepts. 
5.2.1 Contradictory Tension 
During this phase, the salient contradictory tension 
derives from the fact that the expanding digital 
infrastructure requires resources to support and 
coordinate its day-to-day operations but also needs 
them to innovate and increase its functionality. Gal, 
Lyytinen, and Yuoungjin (2008), Monteiro et al., 
(2013), and Rodon and Silva (2015) have explained 
this contradictory tension in digital infrastructures but 
not specifically within their evolution. At RE/MAX, 
the corporate team worked hard at communicating and 
coordinating day-to-day operational activities relating 
to MainStreet. However, changes were still needed so 
that the team could understand why some attempts to 
improve the system had worked, while others had not. 
Furthermore, given that during the previous phase the 
responsibility for the digital infrastructure had resided 
exclusively within the corporate team, this 
structural arrangement led to tensions that created 
a sense of isolation, delayed wider awareness-
raising of the technology and the problems that it 
could solve, and hindered communication and 
coordination of day-to-day operational activities 
relating to the digital infrastructure. 
5.2.2 Supporting Leadership 
During this phase, top management plays an important 
role in managing the transition from a differentiated 
corporate team into two separate operational units. It is 
actively involved not only in carefully selecting and 
assigning the operational leaders for both operational 
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units, but also in positioning the digital infrastructure 
within the firm, facilitating the knowledge and 
resource flow, and granting subordinates sufficient 
autonomy to keep the infrastructure evolving. At 
RE/MAX, Liniger’s leadership was crucial in 
assigning members of the corporate team to lead and 
guide the two separate organizational units and ensure 
cooperation and support not only between the two units 
but also from partner firms. On the other hand, the role 
of middle managers in this phase is to expand the 
digital infrastructure while legitimizing its use in the 
firm. It requires a group of middle managers to craft an 
engaging vision to increase the use of the digital 
infrastructure, monitor new opportunities, and generate 
innovative ideas to improve the infrastructure. At the 
same time, a different group of middle managers is 
needed in overseeing day-to-day tasks, establishing 
processes, providing clear targets, addressing problems 
when they occur, and handling external partners.
 
Table 5: Salient Contradictory Tension, Supporting Leadership and Structure,  
and Tension Resolution in the Cultivating Phase 
Salient  
contradictory 
tension 
• When expanding a digital infrastructure, resources are required to coordinate day-to-day operations, 
but also to innovate and increase the functionality of the infrastructure. 
Supporting 
leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supporting 
structure 
      
1st-order theme 
 
• Top management actively involved in positioning the digital infrastructure  
within the firm, assigning operational leaders and providing resources 
  
2nd-order theme  
 
 
Supporting 
top mgmt. 
 
 
 
• Middle management involved in finding creative ways to roll out the 
digital infrastructure   
 
• Operational management involved in embracing the digital infrastructure 
 
 
  
 
Supporting middle 
& operational  
 mgmt. 
 
1st-order theme 
 
• Formalizing the initial working group as an operational unit 
 
• Separating the management of exploration and exploitation 
 
2nd-order theme  
 
Supporting 
independent 
structure 
 
Tension resolution 
(ambidexterity) 
exploration 
activities 
 
 
 
 
Exploitation 
activities 
1st-order theme 
 
• Expanding through complementary technologies and services found outside 
the firm 
 
• Expanding through complementary technologies and services found inside 
the firm 
 
2nd-order theme  
 
 
Expanding 
capability 
1st-order theme 
 
• Technology becomes part of day-to-day operations 
 
• Leveraging and co-opting technology and services from outside the firm to 
expand the digital infrastructure 
 
• Legitimizing initiatives taken by individual offices/affiliates 
 
• Establishing corporate funding to support adoption 
 
2nd-order theme  
 
 
 
 
Legitimizing 
capability 
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Table 6: Representative Supporting Data for Each First- and Second-Order Theme in the Cultivating Phase 
First-order themes First-order themes Representative data and quotes from RE/MAX 
Supporting top 
management 
Top management actively involved in 
positioning the digital infrastructure 
within the firm, assigning operational 
leaders and providing resources 
Liniger formalized the functional structure to house the 
initiative and provided the funding needed. 
 
Supporting Middle and 
Operational Management 
Middle management involved in 
finding creative ways to roll out the 
digital infrastructure   
“My job was to do marketing communications to our 
members and run contests to get people to use 
MainStreet.… For example, MainStreet Madness was 
wrapped around a basketball theme in March. We did an 
entire campaign to get our members to use it”.   
“We identified opportunities.… Technology initiatives like 
Design Center and LeadStreet came from affiliates. We 
took the idea and made it work for the whole franchise”. 
Operational management involved in 
embracing the digital infrastructure 
“Brokers can recruit and retain agents more easily by 
making available to them technological tools that generate 
leads and referrals, facilitate network communication, and 
track listing and sales activities”.  
“We have always said the best ideas come from the field. 
The ideas start small because the regions have the 
flexibility. They have fewer people to explain how money 
is spent”. 
Supporting independent 
structure 
Formalizing the initial working group 
as an operational unit 
 
A member of the corporate team, Kristi Graning, was 
promoted to head of Corporate IT to manage MainStreet. 
Separating the management of 
exploration and exploitation 
 
Two separate units were created, reporting to Corporate IT: 
“The IT department is more in the execution of the 
technology. The other one [eBusiness] is looking for the 
next functionality”. 
Expanding capability Expanding through complementary 
technologies and services found 
outside the firm 
 
“To understand further the opportunities that MainStreet 
could bring to the company, the eBusiness department 
actively sought providers of complementary resources and 
services that could be integrated”. 
Expanding through complementary 
technologies and services found inside 
the firm 
“In eBusiness, we devoted part of our planning to 
evaluating initiatives developed at different RE/MAX 
affiliates”. 
Legitimizing capability Crystallizing the objective of the 
digital infrastructure 
MainStreet was redesigned several times to provide most of 
the resources needed by RE/MAX associates and staff 
members. MainStreet added services such as breaking 
news, company information, online discussion threads, chat 
areas, and a library for documents, forms, and training 
materials. 
Leveraging and co-opting technology 
and services outside the firm to expand 
the digital infrastructure 
RE/MAX established agreements with different providers 
who offered their services to all its franchise members. 
Legitimizing initiatives taken by 
individual offices/affiliates 
“We [at eBusiness] just took the idea and made it work for 
the whole franchise… So, our job is to decide what we roll 
out and when to say, ‘handle it at your office level’”.  
Establishing corporate funding to 
support adoption 
The fee charged to agents for using the technology was 
removed. Instead, headquarters provided the funding 
needed to expand the digital infrastructure. 
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5.2.3 Supporting Structure: Independent 
In the cultivating phase, the structure supporting the 
digital infrastructure shifts from the differentiated 
corporate team into two independent operational units. 
One of these units is responsible for continuing 
learning and finding creative ways to expand the 
technology, drive change, and make improvements, 
and the other for designing effective processes, 
reacting to operational challenges, and managing the 
relationships with providers of the core and 
complementary technologies and services. 
Establishing independent units configured to pursue 
either exploration or exploitation according to the 
specific requirements of each unit’s task environment 
can be beneficial (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Such 
structural separation creates “pragmatic boundaries”, 
which facilitate units to focus on exploration or 
exploitation while protecting them from being affected 
by the rest of the organization (Carlile, 2004). At 
RE/MAX, the cultivating phase began with the 
creation of two independent units: eBusiness and the 
IT department. eBusiness was the smaller and more 
flexible of the two units and specialized in pursuing 
exploration and learning from a broad spectrum of 
actual and potential MainStreet users and partners. The 
IT department, on the other hand, shouldered the 
burden of integrating MainStreet with the rest of the 
organizational processes and the existing technological 
infrastructure. Given that both units reported to 
Corporate IT, the distance between them allowed them 
to leverage each other’s competencies, spreading the 
required knowledge quickly and efficiently and 
reducing the level of support required and friction 
involved in expanding the use of MainStreet.   
5.2.4 Ambidexterity (Tension Resolution) 
We find two capabilities, expanding and legitimizing, 
that are critical during the cultivating phase in 
resolving the tension discussed above and creating a 
virtuous cycle as the digital infrastructure develops 
further and its scope enlarges, while at the same time it 
receives a functional space within the firm’s 
operational rules and standards. 
Expanding is the ability to increase the functionality and 
innovation, develop further, and increase or extend the use 
of the digital infrastructure. In the cultivating phase, critical 
exploration-oriented activities that help to resolve 
contradictory tensions include those that relate to gaining 
new insights and recognizing complementary technologies 
and services from inside and outside the firm that could be 
incorporated. At RE/MAX, during this phase, the infusion 
of innovations from outside partners and service providers 
was an important enabler in expanding MainStreet. In 
addition, eBusiness devoted an important part of its 
planning to evaluating initiatives developed at different 
affiliates so that the unit had a better understanding of 
opportunities to improve MainStreet. 
Legitimizing is the ability to affirm and give a 
functional space to the digital infrastructure within the 
firm and in accordance with operational rules and 
standards. During the cultivating phase, it is important 
to ensure the digital infrastructure becomes a formal 
part of the firm’s day-to-day work and its operational 
rules and standards. Critical activities include 
communicating to the rest of the organization that the 
digital infrastructure is part of day-to-day operations, 
leveraging and co-opting technology from outside the 
firm to expand the digital infrastructure, legitimizing 
initiatives made by some offices and affiliates to be 
used by the whole firm, and establishing corporate 
funding to support adoption of the infrastructure. This 
is in accordance with prior findings that competency 
building is affected by the firm’s ability to legitimize 
its strategic initiatives (Dosi & Marengo, 1992). 
5.3 Balancing Exploration and 
Exploitation in the Growing Phase 
Table 7 shows the data structure of our findings during 
the growing phase of the digital infrastructure 
evolution. Table 8 provides representative supporting 
data from RE/MAX for each second-order theme. 
5.3.1 Contradictory Tension 
During this phase, the salient contradictory tension 
derives from the fact that, as the digital infrastructure 
becomes embedded, there is the need for stable control 
over resources, but also for flexibility over how 
resources are controlled and the capacity to 
accommodate the competing goals of stakeholders. 
This tension arises from the continuous need to keep 
the digital infrastructure fresh and changing with the 
evolving business environment and as new 
expectations and requirements emerge. At the same 
time, pressures persist to embed the infrastructure even 
further in the firm, as identified by Scott and Wagner 
(2003) and Henningson and Henriksen (2011). 
5.3.2 Supporting Leadership 
During this phase, top management’s role is to 
maintain oversight. Even though it is not as actively 
involved as in previous phases, top management relies 
on structural mechanisms to create a sense of 
accountability and track progress and, more 
importantly, to accommodate the needs of the multiple 
stakeholders now involved. Given the increased 
complexity arising from the growth of the digital 
infrastructure and the structural arrangements to 
support it, middle managers are involved in stabilizing 
the infrastructure operation and installing reliable 
processes, while simultaneously accommodating 
stakeholders’ competing needs and goals. 
Furthermore, as the digital infrastructure becomes 
firmly established in the firm and the fear over whether 
it will be adopted has dissipated, middle management 
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engages in shared activities and builds teams of 
operational managers with different types of 
complementary capabilities—including task 
complementarities (for example, defining and 
assigning clear functional roles for subunits), expertise 
complementarities (for example, teams made up of 
members with differing levels of training and 
experience through their various positions and roles), 
and social complementarities (arising from the 
different skills and personalities of the team members). 
These complementarities help increase the variety of 
skills required to give the flexibility to explore different 
ways of delivering the digital infrastructure more 
efficiently and to search creatively for new ways of 
deriving value. At the same time, they also provide more 
stability for the operation of the infrastructure, facilitate 
cooperation, support efficient decision-making 
processes, and focus everyone on common objectives. 
Table 7: Salient Contradictory Tension, Supporting Leadership and Structure, 
and Tension Resolution in the Growing Phase 
Salient  
contradictory 
tension 
• An embedded digital infrastructure requires stable control over resources and increased stakeholder 
involvement, but also flexibility in controlling those resources and in accommodating stakeholders’ 
competing goals 
Supporting 
leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supporting 
structure 
      
1st-order theme 
 
• Top management involved in maintaining oversight while giving 
autonomy to operational units 
 
 
 
2nd-order theme  
 
Supporting  
top mgmt. 
• Middle management involved in stabilizing the infrastructure operation  
and processes while seeking ideas for improvement 
 
• Operational management involved in further developing the digital 
infrastructure    
 
  
Supporting middle 
& operational 
mgmt. 
1st-order theme 
 
• Creating structures to specialize further in exploration and exploitation 
 
• Formalizing structural mechanisms to involve key stakeholders 
2nd-order theme  
 
Supporting   
integrated 
structure 
 
Tension resolution 
(ambidexterity) 
exploration 
activities 
 
 
 
 
 Exploitation 
 activities 
1st-order theme 
 
• Continuously identifying ways of integrating the digital infrastructure 
 
• Involving key stakeholders in further developing the digital infrastructure 
2nd-order theme  
 
 
Augmenting 
capability 
1st-order theme 
 
• Investing in a stable digital infrastructure base 
 
• Establishing a stable funding model for the digital infrastructure  
 
Second-order theme  
 
Implanting 
capability 
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Table 8: Representative Supporting Data for Each First- and Second-Order Theme in the Growing Phase 
Second-order themes First-order themes Representative data and quotes from RE/MAX 
Supporting top 
management 
Top management involved in maintaining 
oversight while giving autonomy to 
operational units 
 
“The management vision follows an eagle-eyed 
approach in overseeing the changes in the technology. 
We have meetings to assess how any change [in the 
technology] would impact our membership and, then, 
how it would impact our recruiting and retention, for 
example”. 
Supporting middle and 
operational management 
Middle management involved in stabilizing 
the infrastructure operation and processes 
while seeking ideas for improvement 
“Middle management at RE/MAX provided training, 
communication, and coordination with individuals 
who are involved with MainStreet”.  
Operational management involved in further 
developing the digital infrastructure    
“Back then [second phase], when we came up with an 
idea, we would spend several hours putting a business 
plan together.… Today franchisees want to have 
involvement, provide input, and have a say in how 
things get implemented. Very rightfully so, as 
technology impacts their agents and brokers and they 
want to be a part of that”. 
Supporting integrated 
structure 
Creating structure to further specialize in 
exploration and exploitation  
RE/MAX created a VP of Emerging Technologies 
position, responsible for identifying and exploring 
new long-term IT trends. On the other hand, the IT 
department, responsible for support of MainStreet, 
was moved to report directly to the RE/MAX COO. 
Formalizing structural mechanisms to 
involve key stakeholders 
Several structural mechanisms were established to 
communication and coordination with the technology 
stakeholders, which in turn balanced exploration and 
exploitation activities. 
Augmenting capability Continuously identifying ways of integrating 
the digital infrastructure 
Given the strategic importance of the Internet for 
RE/MAX and its associates, RE/MAX top 
management hired external consultants to help them 
identify ways to further integrate its digital 
infrastructure with the company’s operations. 
Involving key stakeholders in further 
developing the digital infrastructure 
“Twice a year ideas are solicited within and outside 
the company. These suggestions help identify 
disruptive technologies, new business models, and 
attractive new markets.… Based on these findings, I 
will then begin to socialize promising ideas among 
senior executives and broker owners, to determine 
acceptance”. 
Implanting capability Investing in a stable digital infrastructure 
base 
RE/MAX acquired a specialized technology 
infrastructure base to provide MainStreet services in-
house. 
Establishing a stable funding model for the 
digital infrastructure  
 
MainStreet became financed by the franchise itself 
(not by headquarters) as part of its national 
advertising fund. 
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5.3.3 Supporting Structure: Integrated 
No business unit in an organization has all the internal 
capabilities necessary to manage a successful digital 
infrastructure, especially when it is making rapid 
technological advances (Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996). This creates a demand for specific 
knowledge and resources from other business units 
(Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). In the growing phase, the 
structural arrangement (two separate operational 
business units) that led the digital infrastructure in the 
cultivating phase naturally outgrows its ability to use 
only employees from those units to interpret, integrate, 
and engage in coherent exploration and exploitation 
activities. Cooperating in technology activities, 
transferring employees between departments, creating 
company-wide funding to support the digital 
infrastructure, and establishing cross-unit committees 
are examples of structural mechanisms that leverage 
the expertise of individuals, keep knowledge 
circulating continuously, and ensure cross-fertilization 
between business units (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; 
Taylor & Helfat, 2009). They also help keep the 
infrastructure from becoming inflexible and outdated 
and help managers consider how the future can or may 
be different from the past. Integrating formal and 
informal structural mechanisms in order to cope with 
the competing demands that arise from the 
simultaneous pursuit of exploitation and exploration in 
this phase of the digital infrastructure evolution is 
consistent with the concept of contextual 
ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkingshaw, 2004; Im & 
Rai, 2008). Contextual ambidexterity refers to a set 
of mechanisms within the organization that facilitate 
and encourage organizational units and employees 
to do contradictory tasks at the same time (Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004). 
5.3.4 Ambidexterity (Tension Resolution) 
We find two capabilities, augmenting and implanting, to 
be critical during this phase in resolving the 
contradictory tension mentioned above and in creating a 
virtuous cycle to keep the digital infrastructure fresh and 
produce value. At the same time the help in embedding 
digital infrastructure even further within the firm, 
making it an integral part of the firm’s operations. 
Augmenting is the ability to make the digital 
infrastructure produce better results or value, and 
augment flexibility by increasing stakeholders’ 
involvement. Since the digital infrastructure is 
embedded in the organization, exploration activities 
during this phase are driven mainly by continuously 
identifying ways of integrating the digital 
infrastructure as well as involving key individuals—
especially those with various stakes in the 
infrastructure’s continued success. This helps to 
facilitate the circulation of new knowledge, produce 
better results, and extract further value from the 
infrastructure. By augmenting the sources of relevant 
knowledge and fostering collaboration and better 
understanding, organizations ultimately strengthen and 
fuel the growth of their digital infrastructure 
(Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). This finding also 
concurs with past research that shows that intra-unit and 
inter-unit boundary spanning enables the exploration of 
knowledge (Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007). 
Implanting is the ability to fix the digital infrastructure 
firmly and deeply within the firm and make it an 
integral part of operations. In the growing phase, the 
focus of the exploitation activities is on investing in a 
stable digital infrastructure base and establishing a 
funding model to embed the technology firmly in the 
day-to-day routines, drive its ultimate impact on the 
business, and stimulate both the digital infrastructure 
supply and demand to accommodate the needs and 
goals of multiple stakeholders. The result is that the 
rate of assimilation increases further, a consequence of 
a positive feedback loop (Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, & 
Welch, 1992; Henfridsson & Bygstad, 2013). At 
RE/MAX, during this phase, the strategic importance 
attached to MainStreet and to meeting users’ needs was 
well understood across the firm. Having assessed those 
needs, the firm acquired a specialized technological 
base. In addition, to further integrate the digital 
infrastructure and the business, it is critical during 
this phase to stabilize the business model (including 
the sources of funding to sustain and grow the digital 
infrastructure). This can help direct a firm’s 
evolutionary path, as suggested by Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen (1997). 
6 Discussion: A Theoretical Model 
of Ambidexterity in the Digital 
Infrastructure Evolution 
From our analysis and integration of the case study 
findings, we identified the static data structures for the 
key concepts that emerged, as displayed in Tables 3-8. 
In this section, we discuss the dynamic relationships 
among them that are the basis for our theoretical model 
of digital infrastructure ambidexterity, as shown in 
Figure 1. The model identifies three pairs of 
capabilities (identifying-germinating, expanding-
legitimizing, and augmenting-implanting), three levels 
of supporting leadership (at the top, middle, and 
operational), and three types of supporting structure 
(differentiated, independent, and integrated) that help 
in resolving salient contradictory tensions 
(ambidexterity) in each phase. Further, while some of 
the management strategies that contributed to 
ambidexterity at RE/MAX were deliberate and 
intended, others evolved as learning and capability 
accumulation took place. Thus, the study shows that 
digital infrastructure ambidexterity involves deliberate 
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investment in processes that have been characterized in 
prior literature as the firm’s ability “to learn how to 
learn” (Danneels, 2002). This model should be seen as 
a theory-building exercise that may then be subjected 
to empirical scrutiny in future research. Accordingly, 
we put forward a set of observations with regard to 
managing contradictory tensions in the evolution of 
digital infrastructure. 
In relation to leadership, the model identifies the role 
that top, middle, and operational management play in 
supporting digital infrastructure ambidexterity. It 
thereby answers the call from Andriopoulos and Lewis 
(2009) for more research that addresses the tensions 
between exploitation and exploration at multiple levels 
of management. Prior research has found that top 
management plays a crucial role in facilitating a firm’s 
ability to perform better (Smith &Tushman, 2005), 
shaping individual behavior (He & Wong, 2004), and 
resolving tensions by creating integrative and 
synergetic value between exploration and exploitative 
activities that support organizational ambidexterity 
(Jansen et al., 2009; Xue, Ray, & Sambamurthy, 2012). 
However, the role of middle and operational 
management in organizational ambidexterity has 
received less attention (Zimmermann, Raisch, & 
Birkinshaw, 2015). Our study shows that these three 
management levels have important yet distinct roles at 
each phase of digital infrastructure evolution. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Ambidexterity in the Digital Infrastructure Evolution 
Tensions in the Evolution of Digital Infrastructure 
670 
 
In terms of structures, the model shows how these vary 
over time in supporting ambidexterity during the 
evolution of a digital infrastructure. In so doing, it 
sheds light on the findings of prior research, which has 
tended to focus on a single type of structure at a time 
to explain ambidexterity. For example, Bower and 
Christensen (1995, p. 44) state: “The only way to 
protect [new technologies] is to create organizations 
that are completely independent from the mainstream 
business”. Conversely, others suggest that 
differentiated units are loosely coupled with a firm’s 
mainstream units (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 
1976). Smith and Tushman (2005) explore how 
corporate teams achieve cross-fertilization between 
exploratory and exploitative activities. Others suggest 
that exploration and exploitation are carried out using 
integrated structures that have little structural 
differentiation (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Westerman, McFarlan, 
and Iansiti (2006) describe separate units that are 
linked to the mainstream organization through 
integration mechanisms at the business unit level, 
while Jansen et al. (2009) find a combination of 
structural differentiation at both corporate and 
business-unit levels. 
In our case study, we observed different dynamics 
associated with balancing exploration and exploitation 
activities at each phase of the digital infrastructure 
evolution. We found that in the initiating phase of the 
digital infrastructure, when the expertise and skills 
required by the new infrastructure are limited, identifying 
and germinating capabilities, supported by a separate 
corporate team (differentiated structure) and actively 
involved top management, is essential. Accordingly: 
Observation 1: In the initiating phase of a digital 
infrastructure, ambidexterity is driven by 
a. top management setting up a differentiated 
corporate team with the required competencies 
and providing them with resources; and 
b. a corporate team evaluating the new digital 
infrastructure (identifying) and also protecting 
the embryonic infrastructure when introducing 
it (germinating) to the firm.  
In the cultivating phase, as understanding of the digital 
infrastructure’s potential increases and its influence 
begins to be felt more widely across the firm, 
expanding and legitimizing capabilities, supported by 
two specialized operational units (independent 
structure) and a combination of actively involved top 
and middle managers, becomes central. Accordingly: 
Observation 2: In the cultivating phase of a digital 
infrastructure, ambidexterity is driven by 
a. top management changing the leadership of the 
digital infrastructure leadership from a 
differentiated corporate team to independent 
operational units that pursue either exploration 
or exploitation; and 
b. one of the units monitoring new opportunities 
and generating innovative ideas to increase the 
use and scope of the infrastructure (expanding), 
while the other oversees day-to-day tasks, 
establishes processes, provides targets, 
addresses problems, and handles external 
partners (legitimizing). 
In the growing phase of the digital infrastructure’s 
evolution, use of the infrastructure becomes a mature 
practice, is embedded in the structures and procedures 
of the firm, and involvement from its stakeholders 
increases. At this point, augmenting and implanting 
capabilities, supported by formal and informal structural 
mechanisms at different levels of the firm (integrated 
structure) and involvement from top, middle, and 
operational managers, are needed. Accordingly: 
Observation 3: In the growing phase of a digital 
infrastructure, ambidexterity is driven by 
a. top management maintaining oversight of the 
digital infrastructure, refining accountability, 
and tracking progress throughout the firm, while 
middle management integrates formal and 
informal structural mechanisms to cope with the 
competing demands arising from increased 
stakeholder involvement; and 
b. integrating structural mechanisms used to keep 
the digital infrastructure from becoming outdated 
and determining how the digital infrastructure can 
produce even better results and extract more value 
in the future (augmenting). At the same time, these 
mechanisms are used to embed the infrastructure 
even further within the firm and make it an integral 
part of the firm’s operations (implanting). 
7 Implications 
For researchers, this study responds to Tilson, 
Lyytinen, and Sørensen’s (2010) call to examine new 
theoretical lenses by which we might understand the 
paradoxical nature of change in digital infrastructure 
evolution. Prior research has mainly focused on 
analyzing strategies that have proven to be effective in 
resolving contradictory tensions—such as adaptability 
(Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2010), structural centralization 
(Broadbent, Weill, & St.Clair, 1999; Ciborra et al., 
2000), flexibility (Braa et al., 2007; Hanseth, 
Monteiro, & Hatling, 1996), governance models (Ure 
et al., 2009), and loosely coupled structures (Fabri, 
2008). This study extends this stream of research by 
developing a conceptual integration of contradictory 
tensions and ambidexterity in order to understand how 
organizations balance exploration and exploitation to 
attend to contradictory tensions in the evolution of a 
digital infrastructure. Our study also extends the work 
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of Gregory et al. (2015) by articulating the 
organizational capabilities used to resolve the 
identified tensions over time—tensions that involved 
various levels of the organization. The contributions of 
our research lie in introducing the concept of digital 
infrastructure ambidexterity and proposing its 
underlying theoretical model. The model adds a 
dynamic perspective, allowing a disparate set of 
strategies to be tied together into a more coherent model 
that can serve as the basis for further investigation.  
The study also has implications for the organizational 
ambidexterity literature. Although it is not possible to 
identify a universal set of capabilities (Teece, 2007), 
we identify that the distinctive sets of higher-order 
capabilities, as well as supporting leadership and 
structures, depend on the tensions that are present at 
each phase of the digital infrastructure evolution. Thus, 
we respond to recent calls for more insights into the 
nature of organizational capabilities required to 
achieve ambidexterity and more inductive research on 
how managers orchestrate the allocation of capabilities 
and resources between old and new business domains 
(Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2013; Raisch et al., 2009). Moreover, this study 
represents one of the first in-depth studies of 
ambidexterity embracing various levels of the 
organization over time. It employs an in-depth case 
study approach, where the focus is on discovering 
patterns of ambidexterity that emerge from “lived 
experiences” (Szulanski & Jensen, 2006). Our research 
also suggests that future research needs to move 
beyond from the reasonably well-developed 
understanding of how individual capabilities 
contribute to ambidexterity (Kale & Singh, 2007; 
Zahra, Sapienza, & Davidsson, 2006) toward 
understanding more about the interdependencies 
between the multiple capabilities that contribute to 
ambidexterity. For example, some authors suggest that 
structural separation is necessary, because each 
exploration and exploitation activity is completely 
different (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976). 
Others recommend oscillating between these structures 
over time (Westerman, McFarlan, & Iansiti, 2006; Jansen 
et al., 2009) or argue that contextual ambidexterity brings 
about an environment in which every employee can 
decide whether to conduct exploration or exploitation 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). We view both structural 
and contextual ambidexterity as being complementary 
options at RE/MAX, with each helping to resolve specific 
contradictory tensions at different phases of the 
infrastructure’s evolution.  
While this study should encourage and assist the 
pursuit of a more holistic understanding of 
ambidexterity in digital infrastructure evolution, 
further research is clearly needed in order to test the 
applicability of the model and observations in other 
contexts. In different firms, digital infrastructure 
ambidexterity may involve other contradictory 
tensions and require a different set of capabilities, 
resources, and activities. As our understanding grows, 
we may learn when (i.e., in what phase of the digital 
infrastructure evolution) specific activities will be 
most effective. For example, contextual ambidexterity 
may be counterproductive in an initiating phase when 
the firm lacks a clear vision of the infrastructure’s 
potential. This point may question some of the factors 
traditionally identified as contributing to 
ambidexterity. Researchers might also conduct 
comparative studies across firms, industries, and 
countries to uncover how ambidexterity in digital 
infrastructure evolution may be enabled or inhibited by 
different contextual factors. This suggests the use of 
historical, cross-sector, or cross-cultural research designs.  
For practitioners, this study also provides important 
lessons. Given today’s dramatic and rapid advances in 
digital technology (computing power, data storage, and 
networks), organizations face the challenge of 
interconnecting system collectives (rather than stand-
alone information systems). So, the importance of 
digital infrastructures will only increase. However, just 
jumping on the digital infrastructure bandwagon, 
without understanding the unique circumstances of the 
firm, is irresponsible and risky. Executives need to 
decide not just whether to join others in embracing a 
new digital infrastructure but, more importantly, how 
to keep renewing and refining it over time.  
The study reveals the importance of understanding the 
broader contexts within which digital infrastructures 
are developed, identifying specific contradictory 
tensions, and managing the capabilities and supporting 
leadership and structures that help to balance 
exploration and exploitation activities at each phase 
of an infrastructure’s evolution, instead of thinking 
about ambidexterity as a “one approach fits all” 
feature. The study also provides specific insights that 
organizations can use to: 
• Reduce time in identifying/germinating during 
the initiating phase of a digital infrastructure 
evolution (for instance, by identifying members 
with complementary knowledge, undertaking 
global benchmarking, absorbing new 
knowledge as a separate group, crystallizing the 
objectives of the infrastructure, assessing the 
technological competence required, and 
establishing early funding to support adoption). 
• Facilitate expanding/legitimizing in the 
cultivating phase of a digital infrastructure 
evolution (for instance, by leveraging 
complementary technologies and services found 
inside and outside the firm, establishing the 
infrastructure as part of the day-to-day 
operations, leveraging and co-opting 
technology and services from outside the firm, 
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legitimizing initiatives developed inside the 
firm, and establishing corporate funding to 
support expansion). 
• Enable augmenting/implanting in the growing 
phase of a digital infrastructure evolution (for 
instance, by continuously identifying ways of 
integrating the digital infrastructure into the 
firm’s operations, formalizing and integrating 
structural mechanisms to involve key 
stakeholders in further developing the 
infrastructure, investing in a stable technology 
base, and establishing a stable funding model). 
An appreciation of the nuances of these insights, together 
with the process model of ambidexterity presented in 
Figure 1, can be used—either ex ante or ex post—to 
explain, anticipate, adjust, or evaluate the balancing act of 
managing the evolution of a digital infrastructure.  
8 Conclusion 
This study was motivated by the need not just to 
recognize how organizations experience and resolve 
contradictory tensions in the evolution of digital 
infrastructure, but also the need to learn about the 
organizational capabilities that drive the actions taken 
to resolve these tensions. The focus on recognizing 
these higher-order capabilities improves our 
understanding of how organizations can find the 
delicate and shifting balance between exploration and 
exploitation activities in the evolution of a digital 
infrastructure. The key theoretical contribution of this 
paper is that it articulates the concept of digital 
infrastructure ambidexterity and develops its 
underlying theoretical model.   
Our research approach has certain limitations that 
should also be considered. First, the findings are 
derived from the path taken at one specific 
organization. Nevertheless, because we have clarified 
the context and identified the capabilities and 
supporting factors that contributed to ambidexterity at 
RE/MAX, other researchers could adapt these insights 
and principles to a different context, and the proposed 
theoretical model and formulated observations could 
serve as a basis for further investigations (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995). Second, we followed 
prior research in studying ambidexterity and limited 
our analysis to two supporting factors (leadership and 
structure) in representing what Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen (1997) refer to as previous paths and position of 
a dynamic capability such as ambidexterity. There may 
be other supporting factors for different paths that 
might impact the evolution of a digital infrastructure. 
Accordingly, future studies that expand the model 
presented in this paper may help to further our 
understanding of ambidexterity. 
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Appendix: Description of MainStreet 
MainStreet evolved from a stand-alone corporate extranet to a fully integrated agent- and broker-driven resource center 
that allows user customization. The platform is designed for flexibility and scalability to accommodate future 
technological needs and enhancements. It is built on the Microsoft SharePoint server and integrates with internal 
systems through common industry standards. This includes the membership management system, listing management 
system, lead management system, content management system, active directory, central email server, customer-facing 
website, and mobile applications. MainStreet also integrates with external vendor systems providing diverse content 
and services. 
MainStreet services include: 
Agent Profile: A personal page for agents to post and share professional details, including service area, listing sites, 
areas of expertise, awards, and industry designations. 
Commercial Resource Center: Commercial data, statistics, and research for commercial real estate sales.  
Design Center: On-demand design studio, containing more than 2,000 print and digital postcards, flyers, brochures, 
newsletters, video tours, and web commercials. May be personalized to individual needs.  
Discussion Forum: Area for brokers and agents to ask questions, share knowledge, and comment on industry trends 
and events. 
Download Center: Library of 50,000 digital files uploaded by RE/MAX headquarters, regions, offices, and sales 
associates. Contains educational material, business resources, and competitive intelligence targeted to broker owners 
and office managers, commercial agents, luxury home specialists, foreclosure sales and distressed property experts, 
and ecofriendly real estate specialists.  
LeadStreet: Lead management dashboard which funnels potential clients to agents through the REMAX.com website. 
Marketing Center: Legally approved images, logos, marketing claims, slogans, and latest ad campaign materials for 
radio, television, print, outdoor, and online marketing purposes. Provides a management tool to launch marketing 
campaigns via email, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, or Google+. 
RE/MAX University: More than 1,200 on-demand training videos covering aspects of building a real estate business. 
Contains training pathways, training videos, agent/broker training on demand, off-site training, webinars, and 
technology training. Provides interactive tools for agents to develop learning plans and meet continuing education 
requirements. Content is provided by RE/MAX headquarters, external real estate training professionals, and high-
performing agents invited to share best practices.  
RE/MAX Weekly: Affiliate-focused news service and weekly email to keep agents abreast of the latest industry news. 
Supplier Center: Connects agents to over 100 approved suppliers to purchase branded products, marketing materials, 
brochures, and magazines. 
Technology Blog: Summary of popular technology trends, new software, and mobile apps. Contains archives detailing 
how to use new technologies to improve real estate business practices. 
Travel Center: Full-service travel agency assisting affiliates with business travel needs. 
Web Roster: Search and communication tool to support between-agent referrals. Facilitates referral fee negotiation 
and transfers relevant customer details between agents located anywhere in the world. 
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